Supplementary Methods
Experiment. How to enforce time constraints in this experiment is an important problem. We chose to allow subjects to respond at any time, to avoid missing observations. However, if the timeconstraint was disobeyed, we imposed a probabilistic penalty such that a dictator's decision was only implemented with a probability of 10%. In the other 90% of cases, the dictator earned 0 and the receiver earned the lower of the two amounts that she could earn in the current game. We chose this scheme relying on IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) to ensure that subjects would not choose a different option outside of the time constraints and trying to minimize the chance that subjects would prefer the penalized outcome (i.e. worst possible outcome for self, worst available outcome for the other). Subjects were notified with a warning message if they were too slow under time pressure or too fast under time delay (Supplementary Figure 1) .
To make sure subjects understood their task, we provided a set of control questions at the beginning of each of the first three parts. In the experiment, we randomly displayed the selfish option and the pro-social option on the left and right sides of the display. We also randomized the display positions (upper or lower) of the dictator's payoffs and the receiver's payoffs across subjects.
Subjects made decisions by pressing the "F" or "J" keys to select the left or right option, respectively.
They saw a waiting screen after each decision and were required to press "Spacebar" to advance to the next trial. At the end of the experiment, we randomly selected one trial for each group and paid them according to one of their decisions (randomly selected). We programed the experiment using z-Tree 1 and recruited subjects via ORSEE 2 . The experimental instructions are as follows.
Supplementary Notes
Supplementary Note 1. Consistent with prior work in this literature 3, 4 , our subjects generally did care about both players' payoffs. In the experiment, subjects chose the selfish option in 42.3% of all games in the time-free condition, they chose the selfish option in 50.7% of all games in the timepressure condition, and they chose the selfish option in 40.3% of all games in the time-delay condition (Supplementary Figure 9) . The median RTs for decisions in the time-free, time-pressure, and time-delay conditions were 2.156 s ( = 2.797), 0.937 s ( = 0.393), and 11.470 s ( = 1.642), respectively (Supplementary Figure 5) . Subjects violated the time constraints in 1.6% of timepressure trials and 1.0% of time-delay trials.
Supplementary Note 2.
In addition to using the median indifference , we also considered three other cutoffs to delineate between selfish and pro-social subjects. One is the median subject-level . .
The median subject-level . in our experiment was 0.288. Using this cutoff, 73% of the selfish subjects chose the selfish option on the majority of trials, while 100% of the pro-social subjects chose the prosocial option on the majority of trials. With this cutoff, the pro-social subjects (n=51) become more pro-social under time pressure (P = 0.051, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test, since is not normally distributed), while selfish subjects (n=51) become marginally more selfish under time pressure (P = 0.221). Similarly, pro-social subjects become less pro-social under time delay (P = 0.054), while selfish subjects become less selfish under time delay (P = 0.001).
The second cutoff is the average reported in Fehr & Schmidt (1999) . The reported in Fehr & Schmidt (1999) was 0.315. With this cutoff, 67% of the selfish subjects chose the selfish option on the majority of trials; while 100% of the pro-social subjects chose the pro-social option on the majority of trials. With this cutoff, pro-social subjects (n=47) become more pro-social under time pressure (P = 0.024, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test), while selfish subjects (n=55) become marginally more selfish under time pressure (P = 0.098). Similarly, pro-social subjects become less pro-social under time delay (P = 0.052), while selfish subjects become less selfish under time delay (P = 0.001).
The third cutoff is the point at which / = . (0.104) in the biased DDM simulations in Supplementary Figure 4c . With this cutoff, 97% of the selfish subjects chose the selfish option on the majority of trials; while 89% of the pro-social subjects chose the pro-social option on the majority of trials. With this cutoff, pro-social subjects (n=72) become more pro-social under time pressure (P = 0.044, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test), while selfish subjects (n=30) become marginally more selfish under time pressure (P = 0.077). Similarly, pro-social subjects become less pro-social (but not significantly so) under time delay (P = 0.278), while selfish subjects become less selfish under time delay (P = 0.005).
Supplementary Note 3.
To ensure that the biases in starting point were not driven by the selfish (pro-social) behavior of subjects, we simulated a selfish subject with a starting point 0.5 and a drift rate of 0.6. In these simulations, 85.4% of all decisions were selfish decisions. Then we estimated the biased DDM based on the simulated data. We recovered a starting point of 0.484. Therefore, selfish (pro-social) preferences do not appear to produce starting point biases.
To check whether the biases in starting points might have been caused by unaccounted for variability across subjects, we simulated ten selfish subjects with a starting point 0.5 and drift rates 0.1 to 1 in step of 0.1. In the simulations, 79.7% of all decisions were selfish decisions. We then estimate the biased DDM at the group level based on the simulated data. We recovered a starting point of 0.502. Therefore, drift rate variability across subjects does not appear to produce startingpoint biases. Note that in (a) the dots fall between the diagonal (black dashed line) and the horizontal midline, indicating that under time pressure these subjects' choices move towards chance, while in (b) and (c) the dots fall between the diagonal and the vertical midline (red dashed line), indicating that under time pressure these subjects' choices become more extreme. Only this latter pattern is consistent with the results seen in Fig. 2 . The effects of collapsing boundaries are very similar to the effects of tighter boundaries: starting points exert a greater effect on choice with them present. We carried out the simulations using the parameters of the 86 subjects whose . ∈ [−0.5, 1] . We used . to calculate the utility difference (UD) between choice options and let the drift rate (dr) be proportional to UD, that is, = 0.2 * . We used the threshold (a) estimated from the experimental data in the time-free simulations, and we used 0.5a in the time-pressure simulations. Each dot represents one subject. The black dotted line is the identity line. Note that in (a) subjects' choices become more extreme under time pressure in the biased DDM simulations (two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests, P = 0.005 for selfish subjects and P = 0.011 for pro-social subjects (split by the median indifference )), in (b) subjects' choices move towards chance under time pressure in the unbiased DDM simulations (P < 10 -5 for selfish subjects and P = 0.025 for pro-social subjects), in (c) subjects to the left of the vertical red line (split by the median indifference , selfish subjects) are consistently shifted downwards while those to the right (pro-social subjects) are consistently shifted upwards in the biased DDM simulations (P = 0.033 for selfish subjects and P < 0.001 for pro-social subjects), and in (d) subjects in the unbiased DDM simulations do not show that pattern as in (c) and Fig. 2 (P = 0.774 for selfish subjects and P = 0.297 for prosocial subjects). Therefore, only the pattern produced by the biased DDM simulations (a and c) is consistent with the results observed in the experimental data (Fig. 2) . (a) plots the correlation between the starting point and / − . , and (b) plots the correlation between the starting point and . − 6 . For display purpose, (a) includes 71 subjects whose / and . is between -1 and 2, and (b) includes 88 subjects whose . and 6 is between -1 and 2. Selfishly predisposed subjects Selfishly predisposed subjects Selfishly predisposed subjects Selfishly predisposed subjects e f g h
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Pro-socially predisposed subjects Pro-socially predisposed subjects Pro-socially predisposed subjects Pro-socially predisposed subjects Supplementary Figure 7 . Comparisons of the predictions by different models with the experimental data. Here we use Games 1-50 to predict decisions in Games 51-100. Each dot represents one game. X-axis is the probability of selfish choice in the experimental data, and Y-axis is the predicted probability of selfish choice by the biased DDM, the unbiased DDM, the Logit, and the Logit+RT. (a) The predicted probability by the biased DDM for selfishly predisposed subjects. (b) The predicted probability by the unbiased DDM for selfishly predisposed subjects. (c) The predicted probability by the Logit for selfishly predisposed subjects. (d) The predicted probability by the Logit+RT for selfishly predisposed subjects. (e) The predicted probability by the biased DDM for pro-socially predisposed subjects. (f) The predicted probability by the unbiased DDM for prosocially predisposed subjects. (g) The predicted probability by the Logit for pro-socially predisposed subjects.
(h) The predicted probability by the Logit+RT for pro-socially predisposed subjects.
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Supplementary Figure 8. Comparisons of the predictions by different models with the experimental data.
Here we use Games 51-100 to predict decisions in Games 1-50. Each dot represents one game. X-axis is the probability of selfish choice in the experimental data, and Y-axis is the predicted probability of selfish choice by the biased DDM, the unbiased DDM, the Logit, and the Logit+RT. (a) The predicted probability by the biased DDM for selfishly predisposed subjects. (b) The predicted probability by the unbiased DDM for selfishly predisposed subjects. (c) The predicted probability by the Logit for selfishly predisposed subjects. (d) The predicted probability by the Logit+RT for selfishly predisposed subjects. (e) The predicted probability by the biased DDM for pro-socially predisposed subjects. (f) The predicted probability by the unbiased DDM for prosocially predisposed subjects. (g) The predicted probability by the Logit for pro-socially predisposed subjects.
(h) The predicted probability by the Logit+RT for pro-socially predisposed subjects. ( ) estimated from the simulated data in the biased DDM simulations (data for plot a). We carried out the simulations using the parameters of the 86 subjects whose . ∈ [−0.5, 1]. We used . to calculate the utility difference (UD) between choice options, and let the drift rate (dr) be proportional to UD, that is, = 0.2 * .
We used the threshold (a) estimated from the experimental data in the time-free simulations, and we used 2a
in the time-delay simulations. Each dot represents one subject. The black dotted line is the identity line. Note that in (a) subjects' choices become more extreme under time free in the biased DDM simulations (two-sided
Wilcoxon signed rank tests, P < 0.001 for both selfish and pro-social subjects (split by the median indifference )) compared to time-delay conditions, in (b) subjects to the left of the vertical red line (split by the median indifference , selfish subjects) are consistently shifted downwards while those to the right (pro-social subjects)
are consistently shifted upwards in the biased DDM simulations (two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests, P < 0.001 for both selfish and pro-social subjects). Therefore, the pattern produced by the biased DDM simulations in the time-free and time-delay conditions (b) is consistent with the results observed in the experimental data (Fig. 2b) .
Supplementary Tables
Supplementary Table 1 The dependent variable is a dummy which indicates whether the subject became more pro-social ( 1: / > . or 6 > . ) or selfish ( 0: / < . or 6 < . ) compared to the time-free condition. The independent variable Pro-social is a dummy which indicates whether the subject is prosocial or selfish (split according to the median indifference ). Pressure is a dummy which indicates whether the time condition is time pressure or time delay. ***P < 0.005, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05. In the OLS regression, the dependent variable is / − 6 . In the Logit regression, the dependent variable is a dummy which indicates whether / > 6 (1) or / < 6 (0). 33 subjects whose . , / , or 6 are outside of [-1, 2] are not included in the OLS regression. 12 subjects whose . are outside of [-1, 2] are not included in the Logit regression. ***P < 0.005, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05. 6 (1) or . < 6 (0) under time delay, and whether / > 6 (1) or / < 6 (0) across timepressure and time-delay conditions. 33 subjects whose / , . , and 6 are outside of [-1, 2] are not included in the OLS regressions. 12 subjects whose . are outside of [-1, 2] are not included in the Logit regressions. ***P < 0.005, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05. Notes: The starting points of pro-socially predisposed subjects are significantly less than those of selfishly predisposed subjects (P < 0.001, one-sided Mann-Whitney U test). The thresholds of pro-socially predisposed subjects are significantly higher than those of selfishly predisposed subjects (P < 0.001). The non-decision times of pro-socially predisposed subjects are not significantly different from those of selfishly predisposed subjects (P = 0.933, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test). The parameter S of selfishly predisposed subjects is significantly less than that of pro-socially predisposed subjects (P = 0.027, one-sided Mann-Whitney U test). The parameter Supplementary The dependent variable is a binary variable which indicates the sign of the behavioral change across time-pressure and time-delay conditions (1: / − 6 > 0; 0: / − 6 < 0), the sign of the behavioral change across time-pressure and time-free conditions (1: / − . > 0; 0: / − . < 0), and the sign of the behavioral change across time-free and time-delay conditions (1: . − 6 > 0; 0: . − 6 < 0). ***P < 0.005, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05. Notes: The thresholds of pro-socially predisposed subjects are significantly higher than those of selfishly predisposed subjects (P = 0.002, one-sided Mann-Whitney U test). The non-decision times of pro-socially predisposed subjects are not significantly different from those of selfishly predisposed subjects (P = 0.635, twosided Mann-Whitney U test). The parameter S of pro-socially predisposed subjects is significantly less than that of selfishly predisposed subjects (P = 0.001, one-sided Mann-Whitney U test). The parameter 6 of prosocially predisposed subjects is significantly less than that of selfishly predisposed subjects (P = 0.030). The parameter T of pro-socially predisposed subjects is significantly greater than that of selfishly predisposed subjects (P = 0.022).
Supplementary

Supplementary In the unbiased DDM estimation, we fixed the relative starting point at 0.5. The standard errors of the estimators are calculated using a jackknife method 5, 6 and reported in parentheses. N/A, not applicable. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which indicates whether the choice is selfish (1) or prosocial (0). The independent variables are the difference between the dictator's payoffs (DicDiff), the difference between the receiver's payoffs (ReceDiff), and the response time (RT). The models are estimated for selfishly predisposed and pro-socially predisposed subjects separately. The robust standard errors are clustered on each subject and reported in parentheses. ***P < 0.005, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05.
